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The essays in this dissertation explore the causes and
consequences of three prominent U.S. labor market
developments of the 1980s and 1990s: the rapid advent
of workplace computerization, the historic rise in
earnings inequality, and the unprecedented growth of
temporary help supply employment (THS).

1. COMPUTING INEQUALITY: HA VE
COMPUTERS CHANGED THE LABOR
MARKET?
The first dissertation chapter, joint with Lawrence F.
Katz and Alan B. Krueger, examines the effect of skillbiased technological change, as measured by
computerization, on the recent widening of U.S.
educational wage differentials. The first section of the
essay presents evidence on trends in the relative
quantities, wages, and wage bill shares of workers by
education in the aggregate U.S. labor market from 1940
to 1996. A simple relative supply-and-demand
framework is used to interpret these data. Substantial
secular relative demand growth favoring college
workers over the past five decades is necessary to
reconcile an increase of 0.25 in the log college/high
school wage differential from 1950 to 1996
(approximately 0.55 percent annually) with a more than
threefold increase in the employment share of college
graduates. The data are less clear on whether the trend
rate of demand growth for more-educated workers has
increased since the 1970s. Relative demand growth
appears to have been more rapid than usual in the
1980s, but its pace appears to have slowed considerably
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, as is shown in section two
of the essay, a substantial increase in the growth rate of
the within-industry component of the relative demand
for college workers is apparent from the 1960s to the
1970s, and this higher within-industry growth rate is
maintained into the 1980s and 1990s.
The diffusion of computers and related technologies
and changes in the organization of work associated with
effectively utilizing these technologies may be
sufficiently widespread to have contributed to this
pattern of more rapid within-industry skill upgrading in
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recent years. In section three of the essay, we use data
from the October 1984, 1989, and 1993 Current
Population Survey (CPS) supplements to document the
growing utilization of computers in the workplace. We
discuss the mechanisms through which changes in the
costs of information technology may affect relative
skill demands and find that educational upgrading
occurred more rapidly in industries with greater
computer utilization in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Finally, we explore the role of skill-biased
technological change in the growth of the relative
demand for more-skilled workers from 1960 to 1990
by linking data from multiple sources on industry
work-force composition, physical capital intensity,
research and development expenditures, computer
investments, and (for manufacturing industries) trade
penetration and foreign outsourcing variables. We
consistently find for both the manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing sectors that increases in the
utilization of more-skilled workers are greater in the
most computer-intensive industries. Indicators of
employee computer usage, computer capital per
worker, and the rate of computer investment are higher
in industries with more rapid rates of skill upgrading in
each of the last several decades, and in industries with
larger accelerations in skill upgrading in the 1970s and
1980s versus the 1960s. Using these measures of
computerization in a regression framework, we are able
to "account" for approximately 40 percent of the
overall increase in U.S. within-industry skill upgrading
from the 1960s to the 1970s and 35 percent of the
increase in upgrading in manufacturing from the 1970s
to the 1980s, although it is not clear that a causal
interpretation is appropriate. Changes in import
penetration and outsourcing in the manufacturing
sector are not strong predictors of skill upgrading
conditional on the computer investment ratio, but
industries with expanding export shares appear to have
faster growth in nonproduction worker payroll share.
We conclude that skill-biased technological and
organizational changes that accompanied the computer
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revolution appear to have contributed to faster growth
in relative skill demand within detailed industries
starting in the 1970s. While the strong observed
conditional correlations of our computer measures and
the growth in the relative utilization of highly educated
workers may not just reflect causal relationships, it
seems clear that whatever is driving the rapid rate of
within-industry skill upgrading over the past few
decades, it is concentrated in the most computerintensive sectors ofthe U.S. economy. At the same
time, these patterns leave much room for fluctuations in
the rate of growth of the supply of college equivalents,
globalization forces, and changes in labor market
institutions to have contributed to recent movements in
U.S. educational wage differentials.

2. WHY DO lEMPORARY-HELP FIRMS
PROVIDE FREE GENERAL SKILLS TRAINING?
The second disseliation chapter explores a
previously unstudied facet of recent computerization:
the nominally free computer skills training provided by
the majority of U.S. temporary help supply (THS)
establishments. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), training in general, portable skillsparticularly computer skills-was available without
charge or contractual requirement at approximately 75
percent ofTHS establishments as of 1994, seemingly in
defiance of the logic of the competitive model of
training. The second essay investigates this puzzle to
gain insight into the labor market role served by
temporary-help firms and to explore employers'
motivations for offering skills training more generally.
The principal conclusion is that in addition to skills
formation, skills training plays an informational
function at THS firms by helping to elicit private
knowledge that workers possess about ability.
The conceptual model proposed in the essay is
premised on the idea that training is more productiveand hence valuable-to high-ability workers, where
ability is defined as an individual's facility and/or
motivation at learning job skills. Workers are assumed
to have (imperfect) prior knowledge of their ability,
while employers cannot initially perceive ability but
observe it through training. Because of the learning
advantage possessed by high-ability workers, firms are
able to offer a package of training and initially lower
wages that induces self-selection. Workers of high
perceived ability choose to apply to firms offering
training in expectation of wage gains in permanent
employment, while low-ability workers are deterred by
lower wages and limited expected gains. Firms profit
from their training investment ex post via their ShOli-
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run informational advantage about ability and thereby
limited monopsony power.
Since the economic theory of training implicitly
concerns how market forces impact training provision
and payment, the model further explores how firms
may adjust wages and training to accommodate
competitive pressure as proxied by a "markup"
parameter. Perhaps counter to the intuition of the
standard framework, the model indicates that THS
firms will choose to provide additional training to
attract skilled workers as competitive conditions
tighten. The explanation for this result is
straightforward: due to their limited monopsony power,
firms maximize profits by providing a level of training
that is socially sub-optimal-equating marginal firm
benefits with costs while ignoring gains accruing to
workers. When heightened market competition
requires firms to raise wages, they therefore find it
optimal to provide additional efficient training that
increases both wages and output. Since trainees earn
less on average than non-trainees, the implication is
that competition squeezes employer rents, narrowing
the wedge between training and non-training wages.
Tests of the model using a confidential BLS survey
of wages and training in the THS industry find
consistent support: wages are lower at establishments
offering training by a modest but statistically significant
magnitude; heightened market competition, as
measured by a Herfindahl index, substantially increases
finns' propensity to offer free training; and, although
training grows with market competition, the wage gap
between training and non-training firms contracts
significantly. These findings are supplemented by an
analysis of a national survey on hiring, training and
placement at THS establishments conducted by the
author. The survey results indicates that, consistent
with the model, THS establishments offering free skills
training are significantly more selective in their hiring
criteria than non-training establishments, place a
greater fraction of their workers in permanent positions,
and primarily view training's role as one of attracting
and screening motivated and capable workers.
Based on these findings, the essay draws three
conclusions. First, the research suggests that in
addition to its conventional human capital role, training
may usefully be viewed as a mechanism for eliciting
private information about worker ability. In particular,
in an environment in which ability and training are
complementary and where workers hold initially
superior information about their own ability, the
analysis indicates that firms may employ training
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strategically to differentially attract and retain more
capable and motivated workers.
Second, understanding the informational role played
by training at THS firms may inform a question raised
by many labor market analysts: what function do THS
firms serve in the labor market and why are they
growing so rapidly? A potential answer supplied by the
present research is that in addition to providing labor
services, THS firms gather and supply information
about worker quality to the market. If the benefits to
employers of making informed hiring decisions have
increased recently, perhaps due to a changing legal
environment surrounding worker dismissal (as
discussed in the third dissertation chapter) or due to
technological and organizational changes which more
closely tie productivity to worker ability (as discussed
in the first chapter), the growth of the THS industry as
an information broker may be a partial result.
A final noteworthy implication of the essay is that
the growth of a "contingent" workforce may not imply
a monotonic contraction of employer sponsored skills
training. While an increase in THS employment (and
other forms of arms-length contracting) may reduce
employer's conventional incentives for human capital
investment, the present model also suggests that high
rates of worker turnover require employers to
efficiently attract and screen employees, and that
training may serve as the employment screen of choice
in some contexts. Augmenting this trend, rapid
technological change has likely increased the rate of
skill obsolescence, thereby generating an incentive for
workers to continually replenish skills to maintain
marketability. Hence, paradoxically, training may
become an increasingly effective screening tool even as
its "shelf life" diminishes.
These observations are not to suggest, however, that
the growth of the "contingent" workforce augurs an
overall intensification of skill training efforts. As the
THS example shows, training may be simultaneously
prevalent and of limited depth. The principal argument
is rather that, because training may serve an
informational as well as human capital function, firms'
motivation and propensity for offering skills training
may differ substantially from the conventional
understanding. While training's primary function may
always be to augment worker productivity, its
hypothesized role in selectively attracting and
screening applicants may become increasingly
significant.
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3. OUTSOURCING AT WILL: UNJUST
DISMISSAL DOCTRINE AND THE GROWTH
OF TEMPORARY-HELP EMPLOYMENT
Building on the view that temporary-help firms
may serve a screening function for permanent
employment, this chapter explores a potential cause of
the apparent increase in employer demand for
screening and arms-length contracting: the erosion of
the common-law doctrine of employment at will. Until
the late 1960s, U.S. common-law employment doctrine
held, with few exceptions, that unless explicitly
contracted otherwise, employers and employees
possessed unlimited discretion to terminate their
employment relationships at any time and for any
reason without legal consequence. Between 1973 and
1995, however, courts in 46 states adopted exceptions
to the employment at will doctrine, thereby limiting
employers' discretion to terminate workers and opening
them to potentially costly litigation. DUling the same
period, temporary-help employment grew at the
unprecedented rate of approximately 11 percent
annually. The goal of this chapter is to assess whether
the contemporaneous growth of temporary-help supply
and the rapid decline of employment at will are
causally related.
Section 1 of this essay provides a legal history of the
adoption and erosion of the at-will doctrine, discusses
the three categories of exception to the doctrine
recognized by the courts, and considers their
implications for temporary-help supply. Because THS
firms are bound by the same legal restrictions as other
employers, it is not obvious a priori that the erosion of
employment at will should advantage THS. In
particular, the essay argues that two of the doctrinal
exceptions, the public policy and implied covenant
exceptions, are unlikely to have had significant impacts
on THS. A third exception, however, the implied
contractual light to continued employment ("implied
contract" exception) appears highly relevant to THS.
Unlike the public policy and implied covenant
doctrines, which primarily limit terminations that
violate ethical or public policy norms, the implied
contract doctrine bars terminations where employers
may have by action, policy, or industry practice implied
that they would only terminate employees for valid
cause, i.e., poor pelformance or economic necessity.
By providing numerous employees with a legal right to
ongoing employment (frequently in cases where the
contract was neither originally intended by the

9

employer nor expected by the worker), the implied
contract exception creates significant costs and legal
uncertainty for many employers-but notably not for
THS employers. Because THS employment is by
nature temporary, courts are quite unlikely to recognize
an implied contract action by a THS worker. Hence,
the analysis suggests that the widespread adoption of
the implied contract doctrine might plausibly have
contributed to the rapid growth of THS.
To formalize these ideas, section 2 develops an
illustrative model of the impact of firing costs on firms'
hiring, screening, and outsourcing decisions. The
model is predicated on three ideas. First, although the
legal environment may make it costly for employers to
terminate workers who are hired directly, employers
may contract for workers terminable at will through a
THS supplier that charges a "markup" for its services.
Second, firms face ex ante uncertainty about worker
productivity or "fit" that may be partly resolved through
a period of trial employment. Third, workers have an
option to make productive up-front investments in firmspecific capital. but the value of this capital is destroyed
when workers are terminated.
The model suggests that there exists a trade-off
between reducing termination costs via THS
contracting (outsourcing) and motivating workers to
make productive specific capital investments, i.e.,
"taking a personal stake in the company." How firms
resolve this trade-off for a given job depends not only
on the extent of firing costs but also on the value of
specific capital investment foregone by outsourcing.
Greater firing costs lead to increased temporary-help
employment, both on the extensive margin (greater
occupational scope) and on the intensive margin
(greater "depth" within an occupation). Occupations
that were previously hired directly shift towards THS
contracting, while those already contracted through
THS experience fewer temporary-to-permanent
conversions. The relative size of THS grows.
Moreover, because firing costs are likely highest in
occupations where specific capital is most important to
productivity, it is plausible that workers with relatively
lower firing costs will be predominantly employed
through THS. This implication consistent with the

10

observation that the bulk of occupations contracted
through THS entail relatively low expected firing costs
but also demand predominantly general skills (e.g.,
clerical, assembly, and laborer positions).
To explore these relationships empirically, the
analysis exploits variation in the timing of state comt
decisions recognizing the three employment at-will
exceptions to ascertain whether THS employment grew
disproportionately in states and times after these
exceptions were adopted. Consistent with the legal
analysis, the data reveal a sizable and robust
relationship between adoption of the implied contract
exception and growth of THS employment. I estimate
that in the one- to five-year period after a state's
adoption of the implied contract exception, THS
employment grew on average by 20 percent relative to
trend with no evidence of mean reversion in subsequent
years. By contrast, the public policy and implied
covenant exceptions are not found to have an impact on
THS employment. The findings are robust to numerous
specification checks and the inclusion of a broad set of
covariates. In total, the estimates indicate that due to
court restrictions limiting unjust dismissal,
approximately 291,000 to 399,000 additional workers
were employed in THS on an average daily basis as of
1998. The essay further considers factors that may
cause the empirical analysis to underestimate the total
impact of the changing legal doctrine on THS growth.
Yet, while changes to the at-will doctrine appear to
have significantly impacted the THS industry, the
conclusion emphasizes that the present research does
not constitute a welfare evaluation of the changing legal
doctrine. Because THS is only one margin of labor
market response, it remains plausible that the
compensatory benefits to workers of amending the
doctrine-increased employment security and greater
freedom from retaliatory discharge-outweigh this
potential source of harm. Bearing these qualifications
in mind, the essay provides insight into an institutional
force contributing to the rapidly evolving U.S.
employment relationship and offers the first empirical
evidence supporting an explanation for the growth of
THS employment: the erosion of employment at will.
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